hathawayj has 37 favorites
“The fact that God is the Lord of time I have interpreted to mean that he has a plan or design for history, that nothing takes place outside of the divine will; that he is not limited or changed in any fundamental way by the passage of time, and that God is a metaphysically necessary Being who lives forever and ever. To this I would add the metaphysical properties of relative timelessness. By “relative timelessness” I mean that God is the Creator of our (physical, measured) time; that in contrast to our time, God’s eternity is infinite and immeasurable; and finally that God’s time is dependent on God’s Being, not the other way around.
. In G. E. Ganssle (Ed.), . Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic.” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Response to Critics
. In G. E. Ganssle (Ed.), . Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic.” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Response to Critics
Context:I have concentrated on what Alan means by saying that God transcends time and have neglected what he says on the topic of God as Lord of time. On that latter I also agree with him. Here’s his full statement:
Source:God & Time: Four Views (p. 236)
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“Temporal duration is a dimension of God’s own life; in that absolutely fundamental way God is not “outside” of time. God nonetheless “transcends” time in the sense that God created those cyclic processes that make possible the measurement of time, and in the sense that temporal duration is a dimension of God’s life rather than God’s life being somehow a dimension of time.
Setting off to the side for a moment the assumption that temporal duration is indeed a dimension of God’s own life, I agree with all this. I agree that God transcends time in at least those ways. Even if temporal duration is a dimension of the divine existence, God nonetheless creates the cyclic processes that make possible the measurement of time, and temporal duration is nonetheless not itself the divine substance but “merely” a dimension of the divine life.” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Response to Critics
Setting off to the side for a moment the assumption that temporal duration is indeed a dimension of God’s own life, I agree with all this. I agree that God transcends time in at least those ways. Even if temporal duration is a dimension of the divine existence, God nonetheless creates the cyclic processes that make possible the measurement of time, and temporal duration is nonetheless not itself the divine substance but “merely” a dimension of the divine life.” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Response to Critics
Source:God & Time: Four Views (pp. 235–236)
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“Not being able to make out this notion of two different sorts of time, I conclude that if time is an intrinsic feature of God’s own life, then the thing to say is not that God created time but that God created the cyclic processes that enable us to measure time—along, indeed, with everything else that is a creature of God.” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Response to Critics
Source:God & Time: Four Views (p. 235)
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“The really important shortcoming in Nick’s essay lies not what he says but in what he leaves out: the implications of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo for God’s relationship to time. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) codified the Christian doctrine of creation by declaring God to be “Creator of all things, visible and invisible, … who, by His almighty power, from the beginning of time has created both orders in the same way out of nothing.” This remarkable statement affirms not only creatio ex nihilo in a temporal sense but even a beginning of time itself. What is Nick’s view of the matter? Were there events prior to the moment of creation? If not, did time exist in the absence of any events? Could time have had a beginning? If it did, then how should we construe divine eternity and God’s relationship to time? I invite Nick to reflect further for us on these questions.” — Craig, W. L. (2001). Response to Nicholas Wolterstorff
Source:God & Time: Four Views (p. 224)
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“While I agree with Nick that God has a history, I deny that God’s time can be measured by our space-time. Instead space-time is created by God. This implies that God is beyond the space-time of our universe. So Nick is wrong to suggest that theologians are interested in a timeless God simply because they believe God cannot change in any way. Just as important, I believe, is the idea of time as a created category of existence. I am seeking here to honor the intuition, shared by many if not most traditional theologians over the centuries, that God must in some sense transcend time since he created time.” — Padgett, A. G. (2001). Response to Nicholas Wolterstorff
Source:God & Time: Four Views (p. 220)
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“As all Christians, eternalist or not, will agree that in the incarnation the Son of God did not cease to have the property of immensity (say)—he did not become wholly localized in Palestine—so the eternalist claims that in the incarnation the Son of God did not cease to be timelessly eternal.” — Helm, P. (2001). Response to Nicholas Wolterstorff
Source:God & Time: Four Views (p. 217)
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“Time but No Space?
Rather often it is objected to those who hold that God’s actions have temporal locations that, given the similarities between time and space, they must also hold that God has a spatial location; if one holds that God has a history, then consistency requires that God has a location. I hold that God does not have a spatial location; so what do I say in answer to the charge of inconsistency?” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Unqualified Divine Temporality
Rather often it is objected to those who hold that God’s actions have temporal locations that, given the similarities between time and space, they must also hold that God has a spatial location; if one holds that God has a history, then consistency requires that God has a location. I hold that God does not have a spatial location; so what do I say in answer to the charge of inconsistency?” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Unqualified Divine Temporality
Source:God & Time: Four Views (p. 208)
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“Those who hold that God is timeless agree, of course, that Scripture offers us this narrative. They deny, nevertheless, that God has a history. Not only does God not come into or go out of existence, there are also no changes in God: no alterations in action, response or knowledge. The biblical narrative is not to be interpreted as presenting items in God’s history; it’s to be interpreted as presenting items in human history. The analogue to numbers is helpful: what appears at first sight to be a history of numbers is in fact a history of human beings dealing with numbers.
Everybody in the orthodox Christian tradition would agree, however, that for the purposes at hand there are some absolutely decisive differences between God and numbers. For our purposes the most important differences to note are that whereas God acts, numbers do not; and whereas God has knowledge, numbers do not.
If one concedes that God acts, how can one nevertheless hold that God has no history, and that the narrative of God’s actions presented to us in Scripture cannot be interpreted as a narrative of God’s history?” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Unqualified Divine Temporality
Everybody in the orthodox Christian tradition would agree, however, that for the purposes at hand there are some absolutely decisive differences between God and numbers. For our purposes the most important differences to note are that whereas God acts, numbers do not; and whereas God has knowledge, numbers do not.
If one concedes that God acts, how can one nevertheless hold that God has no history, and that the narrative of God’s actions presented to us in Scripture cannot be interpreted as a narrative of God’s history?” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Unqualified Divine Temporality
Source:God & Time: Four Views (pp. 203–204)
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“But there’s no story to be told about numbers, no narrative to be composed. That’s because numbers have no history. They neither come into existence nor go out; nor do they change. For some numbers it happens that they are discovered at a certain time; but the event of a number’s discovery is an item in the history of its discoverer, not in the history of the number. Its discovery makes no difference to the number; it represents no change in it.
When it comes to nonevents I propose that we take whether or not something has a history as the determinant of whether or not it is in time. What brings it about that you and I are in time? The fact that we each have a history; about each of us there’s a story that can be told, a narrative that can be composed. What brings it about that numbers are not in time—that they are timeless? The fact that none has a history.” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Unqualified Divine Temporality
When it comes to nonevents I propose that we take whether or not something has a history as the determinant of whether or not it is in time. What brings it about that you and I are in time? The fact that we each have a history; about each of us there’s a story that can be told, a narrative that can be composed. What brings it about that numbers are not in time—that they are timeless? The fact that none has a history.” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Unqualified Divine Temporality
Source:God & Time: Four Views (pp. 202–203)
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“Consider the spatial concepts of here and there. Nobody supposes that these mark a distinction in objective space; nobody supposes that some areas of space have hereness and the others have thereness. The fact that for each of us, at any time, some areas of space are here and the others are there is merely a consequence of the fact that each of us has a location in space, by virtue of having bodies. Here is simply where I am. For bodiless angels there’s no here and no there.
Perhaps past, present, and future are like that. Just as each of us has a location in space, by virtue of each having a body and those bodies having a location, so also each of our actions and responses has a location in time—that is, in the B-series. Perhaps the present is simply the location in time of my act of writing down these words, and of whatever else is simultaneous with that. The past would then be whatever precedes that, and the future whatever succeeds it. It’s only because there are selves having bodies with spatial locations that the concepts of here and there have applicability; perhaps it’s only because there are agents whose actions and reactions have locations in the B-series that the concepts of past, present, and future have applicability.” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Unqualified Divine Temporality
Perhaps past, present, and future are like that. Just as each of us has a location in space, by virtue of each having a body and those bodies having a location, so also each of our actions and responses has a location in time—that is, in the B-series. Perhaps the present is simply the location in time of my act of writing down these words, and of whatever else is simultaneous with that. The past would then be whatever precedes that, and the future whatever succeeds it. It’s only because there are selves having bodies with spatial locations that the concepts of here and there have applicability; perhaps it’s only because there are agents whose actions and reactions have locations in the B-series that the concepts of past, present, and future have applicability.” — Wolterstorff, N. (2001). Unqualified Divine Temporality
Source:God & Time: Four Views (p. 195)
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